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Jill North
(Forthcoming in The Wave Function, David Albert and Alyssa Ney, eds.,
Oxford University Press)∗
What is a world governed by quantummechanics fundamentally like?
In particular, what is the fundamental space of such a world like?
This question is puzzling. For the wave function—the thing that’s
governed by the dynamical laws, the object whose evolution predicts
the results of quantum mechanical experiments—occupies a space that
is very different from the one we seem to live in. The wave function’s
space has many dimensions—many more than the three dimensions of
ordinary space (or four dimensions of ordinary space-time￿). Prima fa-
cie, realism about quantum mechanics seems to require realism about
the wave function and the space it inhabits. But then there’s a glaring
question as to why, if our world is fundamentally quantum mechanical,
we seem to live in a space of only three dimensions.
I argue for a view related to what has come to be called “wave func-
tion realism,” though I wish to put the emphasis in a different place.
Rather than starting from questions about the ontological status of the
wave function (as do other authors who arrive at a view similar to the one
I defend￿), I want to focus on the fundamental space of a quantum me-
chanical world. Wave function realism will naturally go along with the
view, but I will ￿rst argue for realism about the space on which the wave
function lives. The reason is that there are some very general principles,
familiar from elsewhere in physics, supporting the view that this space
exists and is fundamental to such a world—that this is the fundamental
physical space of such a world.
∗I am grateful to David Albert, Otávio Bueno, Alyssa Ney, Ted Sider, Christian
Wüthrich, audience members at the Paci￿c APA in ￿￿￿￿ and Calvin College in ￿￿￿￿,
and the Yale philosophy department for helpful discussion and comments on earlier
versions of this essay.
￿I drop the quali￿cation from now on; it should be understood. Similar questions
arise for four-dimensional space-time as for three-dimensional space.
￿See especially Albert (￿￿￿￿).
￿
The question about the fundamental space of a quantum world is
complicated in two ways that I leave aside here. First, the fundamental
structure of a world’s space(time) may be more properly given by a rel-
ativistic theory. Still, it is plausible that the fundamental theory of our
world will be quantum mechanical. So it is worthwhile to think about
what the world’s fundamental space would be if ordinary quantum me-
chanics is its fundamental theory, leaving aside relativistic quantum me-
chanics or some other ￿nal theory. More important, similar considera-
tions should carry over to the relativistic case; for ease of discussion, I
limit this chapter to ordinary quantum mechanics of particles.￿
Second, there are different theories of quantum mechanics on the
table. This will not affect the thrust of the discussion here, however.
For all theories make central use of the wave function, and this suf￿ces
to generate the questions about space. Different theories disagree on
whether there are other things in the world besides the wave function;
and there is room for debate, on any theory, about what sort of thing the
wave function is. Yet the discussion here takes off from the nature of the
space that all these theories need to de￿ne the wave function.￿
￿Wallace and Timpson (￿￿￿￿) argue that the case for con￿guration space realism
weakens in quantum ￿eld theory because (among other reasons) particles are not fun-
damental and particle positions are imprecise, so the very idea of a con￿guration space
is unclear. On my view, however, the fundamental space is the wave function’s space,
not con￿guration space; see section ￿.
￿All theories, realistically construed, regard the wave function as directly repre-
senting or governing some part of the fundamental ontology. Some theories, though,
posit more in the fundamental ontology that what’s represented in the wave function;
Bohm’s theory also posits particles (or one “world particle”; more later). And on some
understandings of Bohm’s theory—and some understandings of collapse theories like
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) (Allori et al. (￿￿￿￿))—the theory only posits parti-
cles in the physical ontology; the wave function then governs the particles. Differ-
ent theories also disagree on the dynamics of the wave function. They all contain the
Schrödinger equation as a fundamental law, but some theories also have an indetermin-
istic law of wave function collapse, as in GRW. Bohm’s theory contains an additional
dynamical law, the guidance equation, though this can arguably be derived from the
Schrödinger equation plus symmetry considerations. Many-worlds theories add noth-
ing to the fundamental dynamics or ontology beyond the standard formalism and the
wave function. On any theory, it is open to debate whether the wave function alone
represents the fundamental ontology, or whether there are also, or instead, objects
in ordinary space(time). There are different ways of construing the wave function—
￿
This chapter goes as follows. I ￿rst discuss the guiding principles I
rely on, and the ways we use them in our scienti￿c theorizing (section ￿).
I then argue that these principles support the conclusion that the wave
function’s space is fundamental to a quantum world (sections ￿ and ￿).
I end by suggesting that there is a way of reconciling the fundamental-
ity of this high-dimensional space with the three-dimensionality of our
experience (section ￿). Note that for the purpose of this discussion, I
assume realism about quantum mechanics, so that the wave function di-
rectly represents or governs (at least part of; see note ￿) the ontology of
a quantum mechanical world; I will not be arguing for this here.
I have a sneaking suspicion that there will ultimately be a stand-off
between ordinary space and wave function space views, depending on
what sort of evidence one chooses to weight most heavily: whether from
ordinary experience or our usual inferences from fundamental physics
(see the end of section ￿). I suspect there is no conclusive argument
that one type of evidence or the other must be primary—no conclusive
argument for whether to privilege the manifest or scienti￿c image of the
world when these come into con￿ict. I present an argument intended
to resolve the stand-off in favor of the scienti￿c image, but I doubt this
should convince the opponent who starts off prioritizing the manifest
one. My goals here are more modest: to present a case for wave function
space realism and to defray the most counterintuitive consequences of
the view.
￿. The Dynamics as Guide to What Is Fundamental
The principles I will use to argue for the fundamentality of the wave
function’s space can be summed up in slogan form like this: the dynam-
ical laws are a guide to the fundamental nature of a world.
Spelling this out in more detail: how is a world built up, according
to its fundamental physics?
At the fundamental level, there is the fundamental ontology of the
theory, there is the space in which this ontology lives, and there is some
as a ￿eld, a law, a global property of particles, as belonging to another metaphysical
category—but the wave function is invariably central.
￿
structure to that space. Then there are the dynamical laws, which say
how the ontology evolves through this space over time.
This brings me to a very general principle that guides our physical
theorizing, from which the other principles I use all extend: the dynam-
ical laws are about what’s fundamental to a world. The dynamical laws
relate what’s fundamental to what’s fundamental, where what’s funda-
mental includes the fundamental space and its structure, and the funda-
mental ontology. The dynamical laws govern the fundamental level of
reality; that is why they are a guide to the fundamental nature of a world.
When I say that the laws “are a guide to the fundamental nature of
a world,” I mean that we infer the fundamental nature of a world from
the dynamical laws. We do not directly observe the fundamental level
of reality: we infer it from the dynamics. We posit, at the fundamental
level, whatever the dynamical laws presuppose—whatever there must be
in the world for these laws to be true of it.￿
Why emphasize the dynamical laws? Because physics is ￿rst and fore-
most about how and why physical objects move around and interact with
one another, and the dynamical laws are generalizations describing this
behavior. We thus infer the fundamental nature of reality from the dy-
namical laws, which are themselves inferred from the observable behav-
iors of physical objects. We posit, at the fundamental level, whatever is
required for the laws governing objects’ motions.
We are familiar with using this sort of reasoning—the reasoning that
takes us from dynamical laws to the fundamental nature of the world—
for space-time. How do we infer the space-time structure of a world, ac-
cording to its fundamental physics? We look at the dynamical laws and
infer the structure that is needed to support the laws—“support” in the
sense that the laws presuppose that structure; they cannot be formulated
without assuming this structure. That is, we look at the mathematical
space-time structure needed to formulate the theory and infer the corre-
￿Compare Albert (￿￿￿￿) on the dimensionality of ordinary space. Albert suggests
that we do not directly perceive that space has three dimensions. Rather, we see that
there are three independent directions along which ordinary objects can approach one
another and interact (and so there will be three different dimensions implicit in the
dynamical laws governing these motions), and infer from this that ordinary space is
three-dimensional.
￿
sponding physical geometry to the space-time of the world. In particular,
we look at the dynamical laws formulated in a coordinate-independent,
geometric way (coordinate-dependent formulations can sneak in extra
structure that isn’t really required) and consider the space-time struc-
ture needed to formulate the laws in this way. We then infer that this
structure exists in a world governed by those laws. If the laws cannot
be formulated without referring to some structure, then plausibly the
structure must exist in a world governed by those laws.
In a classical mechanical world, for example, we infer that space-time
is Galilean, not Aristotelian. Aristotelian space-time has all the structure
of Galilean space-time, plus an additional preferred rest frame structure.
Yet that further structure isn’t needed or referred to by the dynamical
laws: the laws are the same regardless of choice of inertial frame. This
means that we can formulate the laws without assuming a preferred rest
frame. So we infer that the space-time of the theory doesn’t have this ex-
tra structure. If the laws were not invariant under changes in frame, on
the other hand, then we would infer this structure, for the laws couldn’t
be formulated without it. (Compare: if the dynamical laws weren’t in-
variant under space translations, we would infer that space has a pre-
ferred location. The laws could not be formulated without presupposing
this.)
The rule to infer the space-time structure needed for the dynamical
laws comes in two parts. First, we don’t infer more space-time structure
than what’s needed for the dynamics—just as we don’t infer Aristotelian
space-time in a classical world. We infer the least space-time structure to
the world that’s needed to formulate the fundamental dynamics. Any ad-
ditional structure is excess, super￿uous structure, not in the world—as a
choice of inertial frame in classical mechanics is an arbitrary choice in de-
scription, not a distinction in the world. Second, we infer at least asmuch
structure as needed for the dynamics. We do not infer less than Galilean
space-time structure in a classical world. The dynamical laws presuppose
the distinction between straight and curved space-time trajectories, for
instance, a distinction that is supported by Galilean space-time.￿
￿In North (￿￿￿￿), I argue that classical space-time has a somewhat different funda-
mental structure than standardly supposed, but one that includes a fundamental af￿ne
(inertial, straight-line) structure.
￿
Thus, we infer the minimal structure required for the dynamics—we
adhere to a minimize structure principle￿—and we also infer at least as
much structure as required—we adhere to a “don’t eliminate too much
structure” principle. In other words, we infer just that space-time struc-
ture required or presupposed by the fundamental dynamical laws. The
idea behind this principle is intuitive: a match in structure between the
dynamical laws and the world is evidence that we have inferred the correct
space-time structure to a world governed by those laws.￿
Notice that the same intuitive idea supports a principle to posit just
that fundamental structure to the world—no more, no less—as needed
to support the dynamical laws, regardless of whether this is the structure
of an ordinary low-dimensional space(time) or some higher-dimensional
space. Regardless, the match in structure between the dynamics and
the world is evidence of our having inferred the correct structure to the
world. Regardless, this principle stems from the very general idea that
the dynamical laws are a guide to what is fundamental to a world.
Finally, we also infer the fundamental ontology presupposed by the
dynamical laws. This may be less immediately familiar, but it is some-
thing we typically adhere to. Think of Newtonian physics. In addition to
indicating the space-time structure, the dynamical laws tell us that, fun-
damentally, there are particles, which travel along straight paths unless
acted on by a net external force. The dynamics presupposes that there
are such things; the laws wouldn’t be true if there weren’t. So we infer,
in a Newtonian world, that particles exist at the fundamental level.￿ Just
as a match in structure between dynamics and world indicates that we
have inferred the correct structure to the world, so a match in ontology
between dynamics and world indicates that we have inferred the correct
￿I argue for this principle in North (￿￿￿￿).
￿Compare Earman (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿), (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿).
￿This isn’t to say that Newtonian mechanics could not hold in a world of which
matter is fundamentally gunky, or a world fundamentally containing only macroscopic
objects. In the latter case, the objects can be treated as composed of point-sized bits or
locations of matter to which the laws apply, even if there fundamentally are no particles;
alternatively, the laws can be interpreted as governing the objects’ centers of mass. In
the former, it’s unclear whether to consider the world genuinely Newtonian, though
a version of Newton’s laws can still hold. In typical Newtonian worlds, however, we
make the inference to particles.
￿
fundamental ontology to the world.
In sum: we adhere to a general principle to infer just that fundamental
structure and ontology that is required by the dynamical laws.
Three ￿nal notes on this principle. First, it is a guidingmethodologi-
cal principle; it will not yield conclusive inferences. We cannot be certain
that the structure and ontology indicated by the dynamics is the correct
structure and ontology of the world. We cannot be certain that there is
no preferred frame in a classical world, for instance. Still, the principle
is a reasonable guide, which we think has been successful. (Consider the
inference to Minkowski space-time in special relativity. The special rel-
ativistic laws can be formulated without assuming absolute simultaneity,
so it is reasonable to infer that there is no such structure in the world—
reasonable, even though there could still be a preferred frame.)
Second, the form of the laws from which we read off the structure
and ontology should be geometric. This is typically the simplest, most
objective (coordinate-independent) statement of the laws, and thus the
best guide to the nature of the world, apart from our descriptions of it.
Third, this principle applies to the fundamental level or superve-
nience base. It says to infer just that fundamental structure and ontology
needed for the dynamics.￿￿
In all, we infer the fundamental stuff the dynamical laws need in order
to be geometrically formulated. In the next two sections, I suggest that
we can use this general principle to ￿gure out the fundamental space of
a quantum mechanical world. And we can do so in a way that is less con-
troversial than it might initially seem, given the principle’s more familiar
applications.
￿￿We can think of this as an updated version of Quinean ontological commitment.
Not: what there is, is what the values of the variables range over, so that we ￿rst ren-
der our theory in (￿rst-order) logic and then see what the values of the variables are.
Rather, what there fundamentally is, is given by the (best invariant formulation of the)
dynamical laws, so that we ￿rst render our fundamental theory in geometric terms and
then infer the structure and ontology presupposed by the laws.
￿
￿. The Fundamental Space of a QuantumWorld
It’s now a relatively short step to the conclusion that the wave function’s
space is fundamental to a quantum mechanical world.
In quantum mechanics, the wave function is the mathematical object
that represents the state of a system at a time.￿￿ Think of it as like a func-
tion and like a wave, as it is called. As with a function, the wave function
takes in points of the space on which it’s de￿ned and gives out values,
here complex numbers. As with a wave (or ￿eld), the wave function as-
signs a (complex) number, or amplitude (a “height”),￿￿ to each point in
the space in which it lives. On the standard view, the wave function rep-
resents everything about the fundamental state of a system (where this
system could be the entire world) at a time. (In Bohm’s theory, the funda-
mental state is given by the wave function plus the positions of a system’s
particles.) A system’s history is given by the evolution of its wave func-
tion over time, in accord with the dynamical laws. These laws include (at
least) the deterministic Schrödinger equation. (Depending on the the-
ory, there may be other fundamental dynamical laws; see note ￿. Ignore
these complications here.)
The space on which the wave function is de￿ned is high-dimensional:
￿n dimensions for a world containing what we ordinarily think of as n
particles in three-dimensional space.￿￿ (Whether there really are par-
ticles depends on the theory; more on this later.) This space, which I
have been calling the wave function’s space, is similar to what is called
“con￿guration space,” but these should not be confused. A con￿gura-
tion space represents ordinary particle con￿gurations. Think of classical
mechanics, where the con￿guration space of an n-particle system has ￿n
dimensions, one for the location of each particle along each of three or-
dinary spatial dimensions; each point in this high-dimensional space rep-
resents a possible con￿guration of particles in three-space. A quantum
mechanical con￿guration space is similar in that each point represents a
￿￿Alternatively, we can use a (normalized) vector (or a ray). I discuss later why we
can set aside this other mathematical formulation here.
￿￿And phase, which I ignore here for convenience.
￿￿I leave out spin for convenience. Spin can be represented by extra internal degrees
of freedom at each point of the wave function’s space.
￿
con￿guration of particles in ordinary three-dimensional space. In short,
con￿guration space fundamentally represents particle con￿gurations in
three-space.
The view I defend is that the wave function’s space is fundamental.
Unlike con￿guration space, this high-dimensional space doesn’t funda-
mentally represent particle con￿gurations in three-dimensional space;
the structure of this space isn’t given by particle positions in three-space.
The wave function’s space, not three-space, is the fundamental space
here. The wave function’s space is isomorphic to con￿guration space,
but it should not be confused with a genuine con￿guration space, in the
sense of a space that fundamentally represents particle con￿gurations in
three-dimensional space. Fundamentally, there is no three-space on this
view; a fortiori, fundamentally, there are no particles in three-space.
Now, in a theory like classical mechanics, con￿guration space is seen
as just a mathematical tool.￿￿ The dynamics can be formulated either on
the high-dimensional con￿guration space or a three-dimensional space.
Ordinary experience then suggests that the three-dimensional space is
the one that accurately represents theworld’s fundamental physical space.
In quantummechanics, however, wemust formulate the dynamics on
a high-dimensional space. This is because quantum mechanical systems
can be in entangled states, for which the wave function is nonsepara-
ble. Such a wave function cannot be broken down into individual three-
dimensional wave functions, corresponding to what we think of as parti-
cles in three-dimensional space. That would leave out information about
correlations among different parts of the system, correlations that have
experimentally observed effects. Only the entire wave function, de￿ned
over the entire high-dimensional space, contains all the information that
factors into the future evolution of quantum mechanical systems.￿￿
Following the principle to infer, at the fundamental level of theworld,
￿￿But see North (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿) against its being merely a mathematical tool.
￿￿Thus (here speaking in terms of particles, though remember that on some views
fundamentally there are no such things), two particles’ locations might be perfectly
correlated (always in the same region) or anticorrelated (in different regions). When
projected onto the three-dimensional space for each particle, the wave function for
such an entangled system looks the same whether the particles are correlated or anti-
correlated. See Lewis (￿￿￿￿, section ￿); Ney (￿￿￿￿a, section ￿.￿.), Ney (￿￿￿￿b); Lewis
(￿￿￿￿) for this argument.
￿
just that structure and ontology that is presupposed by the dynamics, we
are led to conclude that the fundamental space of a world governed by
this dynamics is the high-dimensional one. The fundamental ontology,
which includes the wave function, then lives in it.￿￿ (Note that, on a wave
function space version of Bohm’s theory, the fundamental ontology also
includes a “world particle,” whose dynamical evolution in the wave func-
tion’s space gives the evolution of the [non-fundamental; see section ￿]
“particles” in three-space.)
Of course, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between
the wave function as a mathematical object and as a real physical ￿eld—
likewise, between the abstract space on which the mathematical object is
de￿ned, and the physical space on which the physical ￿eld lives. So why
not take the wave function and its space as mathematical tools that do not
represent physical things in the world? Because of our guiding principle.
This principle says to infer, from the mathematical structure needed to
formulate the dynamical laws, the corresponding physical structure and
ontology to the world. Compare the space-time case, in which we take
a theory’s mathematical structure seriously in that it corresponds to a
particular physical geometry in the space(time) of the world.
(Another standard formulation of quantum mechanics uses a differ-
ent mathematical space—an abstract vector space called Hilbert space.
Unlike the wave function’s space, though, this space is not a candidate
fundamental physical space of a quantum world: Hilbert space is just
a mathematical tool that yields a convenient formulation of the the-
ory. Our general principle arguably yields this result. Recall that part
of this principle warns against inferring too little fundamental structure
to the world. One way to infer too little structure is by positing too
minimal a basis on which to recover the ordinary world of our experi-
ence. The Hilbert space formulation seems to contain too little struc-
ture from which to construct a picture of the world as we experience it.
Hilbert space does not support an objective, structural distinction be-
tween positions and other physical properties, like spin, in the way that
the wave function’s space does.￿￿ In addition, the fundamental objects of
￿￿Or, since on this view the wave function is a physical ￿eld, it may be better to say
that it lives “on” this space; Maudlin (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿).
￿￿CompareWallace and Timpson (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿): “the physical universe is...very highly
￿￿
Hilbert space are vectors; the wave function space formulation, on the
other hand, allows for a more familiar particle and ￿eld ontology (albeit
a fundamentally very high-dimensional such ontology). Hilbert space is
best interpreted as an abstract statespace; whereas the wave function’s
space can be interpreted as a physical space, inhabited by the fundamen-
tal physical objects of the theory. In all, it is too hard to recover a perspic-
uous picture of the world from the Hilbert space formalism. Of course,
what counts as perspicuous is a matter of debate. Wallace and Timpson
(￿￿￿￿) (and in a different way Maudlin (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿)) argue that wave
function realism does not yield a perspicuous theory. I disagree, for rea-
sons given in section ￿.)
￿. Against Fundamental Three-Space Views
Our general principle tells against views which maintain that a three-
dimensional space is fundamental to a quantumworld. (Note that on any
such view, the high-dimensional space of the wave function is a genuine
con￿guration space.)
One view says there are two fundamental physical spaces, ordinary
three-dimensional space and a high-dimensional con￿guration space.
The wave function, in con￿guration space, governs the motions of parti-
cles (or other objects, such asmass densities or ￿ashes (Allori et al., ￿￿￿￿);
there will be some such fundamental objects, on this view) in three-space.
This theory has more structure than any view positing a single funda-
mental space. For there are two distinct fundamental spaces, each with
its own structure. What’s more, each spacemust possess additional struc-
ture beyondwhat is normally attributed to it. Further structure is needed
to ground the connections between the two fundamental spaces, saying
which parts and dimensions of the high-dimensional space correspond to
which parts and dimensions of ordinary space, and which axes of con￿g-
uration space correspond to which particle. Notice that this is additional
fundamental structure. As such, it goes against our principle. This is ex-
tra fundamental structure beyond what is needed for the dynamics; it is
excess structure we should do without.￿￿
structured, whereas Hilbert-space vectors seem pretty much alike.”
￿￿David Albert (in a seminar of Tim Maudlin’s at Rutgers University in ￿￿￿￿) has
￿￿
David Albert noted￿￿ that the laws will also be odd on such a view. Or-
dinarily, we predict how things will behave by means of direct geometric
relations among them. That is, all physical objects inhabit a single space,
and the laws governing their motions and interactions are formulated in
terms of the geometry of that space. Thus, consider the electromag-
netic ￿eld and charged particles in classical electromagnetic theory. The
direction and magnitude of the ￿eld everywhere determines, in accord
with the dynamical laws, how the charges in various con￿gurations will
move around. We can look at the one space, ￿gure out what direction the
￿eld is pointing in at a given location, and, using the laws, infer that a test
particle will head in that direction when it passes through the location.
This is unlike the two-fundamental-spaces view of quantum mechanics,
in which the two kinds of thing in the world occupy distinct spaces, and
so lack any direct geometric relations between them; the laws relate the
wave function, in one space, to the particles, in another. (This is where
the extra fundamental structure comes in, to say that this direction in
con￿guration space corresponds to that direction in physical space, in-
dicating how the wave function’s behavior in its space causes the particles
to move around in their space.) It’s odd for fundamental laws to be for-
mulated in terms of structure connecting distinct spaces, instead of the
intrinsic geometry of a single space that everything inhabits. This is un-
like other physical theories with which we are familiar, and it obfuscates
our understanding of how the different objects interact.
The minimize structure principle says to infer that one space alone
is fundamental. Since the dynamics requires the high-dimensional space
of the wave function, we should infer that this space represents the fun-
damental physical space of a world governed by that dynamics. The de-
fender of the two-fundamental-spaces view will reply that ridding the
world of three-space is ridding the world of too much structure, against
raised a similar concern, arguing against what he calls the additional “metaphysical
structure.” Dorr (￿￿￿￿) is a version of the view. (See also the “mixed ontology” view
of Monton (￿￿￿￿).) Dorr defends realism about a fundamental con￿guration space
and a fundamental three-space, with fundamental “putting” relations connecting the
two. It is hard to compare overall structure here: do further fundamental relations add
fundamental structure? It seems to me that this will require more structure than any
single-fundamental-space view, though I admit that this isn’t clear-cut.
￿￿At a conference at Rutgers University in ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿
the “don’t eliminate too much structure” principle. Yet doing away with
a fundamental three-space isn’t yet to say that no such space exists: there
could still be a nonfundamental three-space. I discuss this in section ￿.
(Why does the Hilbert space formulation abstract away too much,
whereas a fundamental wave function space view does not? I have no
conclusive reason for this. The thought is something like the following.
It isn’t abstracting away too much if you do not privilege the existence of
ordinary objects at the fundamental level (see section ￿); we learned that
with the advent of atomic physics. But you should have room in your
fundamental theory for drawing certain ordinary distinctions in some
way or other; doing without such distinctions at the fundamental level
would be abstracting away too much. Exactly how these distinctions are
metaphysically accommodated does not matter. But it matters that you
make some room for them in your fundamental theory. Otherwise, it will
be too dif￿cult to construct an ordinary picture of the world on the ba-
sis of the theory. Thus, the Hilbert space formulation abstracts away too
much because it doesn’t make room at the fundamental level for ordinary
notions like position—it denies an objective distinction between, for ex-
ample, spin facts and position facts—and it doesn’t allow for a funda-
mental particle-￿eld distinction. The wave function space formulation,
on the other hand, does not abstract away too much by denying that or-
dinary objects exist at the fundamental level. More generally, there are
certain kinds of facts without which a fundamental physical theory ab-
stracts away too much, and certain other kinds of facts without which it
doesn’t. The best theory posits the structure and ontology required by
the dynamics while allowing for enough ordinary facts and distinctions.
This is admittedly vague, but I hope somewhat intuitive.￿￿)
Other views say that three-space alone is fundamental. BradleyMon-
ton (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿) argues that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about
￿￿The same reasoning deems the Schrödinger picture, and not the Heisenberg one,
a candidate for describing the fundamental nature of a quantum world, despite the
mathematical equivalence. The Heisenberg picture lacks a metaphysically perspicu-
ous picture of the world: there is just one physical state, unchanging in time; only
the operators change. Maudlin (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿–￿￿￿) discusses the ontological obscurity of
this picture. Muller (￿￿￿￿a,b) discusses the equivalence between the Heisenberg and
Schrödinger formalisms, and notes ways in which the resultant theories are inequiva-
lent.
￿￿
particles in three-space. The wave function doesn’t “live” on a physi-
cal space. It is a mathematical tool, de￿ned on an abstract con￿guration
space, which represents the quantum mechanical properties of ordinary
particles.
This view faces a dilemma. Either Monton says that the quantum
mechanical laws are about the wave function in con￿guration space, in
which case he violates the principle that the dynamical laws are about
what’s fundamental, since for him the wave function and con￿guration
space aren’t fundamental. Or he says that the laws are about ordinary
particles’ properties, which are fundamental. But in that case the laws
will likely be very complicated. (I say “likely” because he doesn’t say ex-
actly how the different quantum mechanical properties of particles are
related to one another.) To be stated solely in terms of things that Mon-
ton takes to be fundamental, the laws must be formulated as constraints
on ordinary particles’ properties, like their locations in three-space. Yet
it is hard to see how the quantum dynamics can be simply formulated in
this way. The version of the laws we are familiar with employs the geom-
etry of the high-dimensional space of the wave function. Monton’s view
also leaves us with a nagging question: what is it about particles’ prop-
erties such that the abstract con￿guration space description is the right
way to represent them? In all, this view lacks structure that’s needed for
the simple, geometric formulation of the dynamics.
Peter Lewis (￿￿￿￿) argues that quantum mechanical con￿guration
space is fundamental, but that it has three dimensions in a relevant sense.
This space is ￿n-dimensional in requiring “that many independent co-
ordinates to parameterize the properties of the system” (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿). But
in another sense, it is three-dimensional: the parameters needed to de-
scribe systems’ fundamental states have a preferred grouping into threes.
So there is a way of understanding everything that happens as unfolding
in a space with three independent spatial directions.￿￿
This does not alleviate the main problem for con￿guration space (or
wave function space) realism, though. Even if con￿guration space is
three-dimensional in some abstract, representational way—even if there
￿￿Lewis (￿￿￿￿) goes on to argue that a quantum world is really three-dimensional—
that the sense in which con￿guration space is ￿n-dimensional is misleading, and in any
case non-spatial.
￿￿
is an abstract way of capturingwhat goes on in three dimensions—intuitively,
the space of the theory is still really—fundamentally—￿n-dimensional,
for this number of dimensions is needed to formulate the dynamical
laws.￿￿ The problem for wave function space realism stems from the
fundamental geometry of this space, not the mathematical geometry of
spaces we can use to represent it. The problem is that the fundamental
geometry needed to formulate the theory, and the corresponding phys-
ical geometry we infer to the world, is not three-dimensional, contrary
to what our experience suggests. That problem remains. (Ultimately,
there may not be a deep disagreement here. I also think there is a sense
in which a quantum world is three-dimensional: there exists a nonfun-
damental three-space [see section ￿]. But I disagree that the wave func-
tion’s space itself is three-dimensional in any sense; nor do I think that
a quantum world is fundamentally three-dimensional. Whether there
is a real disagreement depends on whether Lewis would agree with me
that there is such a thing as the world’s fundamental geometry, which
can differ from the geometry of a nonfundamental space.)
Another view maintaining the fundamentality of three-space is Tim
Maudlin’s (￿￿￿￿).￿￿ According toMaudlin, con￿guration space is amath-
ematical tool for de￿ning the wave function, which governs the behav-
ior of ordinary particles.￿￿ The wave function in con￿guration space—
alongside a world particle, in Bohm’s theory—yields, in Maudlin’s term,
an informationally complete description, from which “every physical fact
about the situation can be recovered” (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿). But this isn’t an on-
tologically complete, “exact representation of all the physical entities and
states that exist” (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿). In other words, the wave function in con-
￿￿In other words, the high-dimensional space is needed for a theory that’s “dynami-
cally complete,” in the sense to be discussed shortly.
￿￿Allori et al. (￿￿￿￿) (see also Allori (￿￿￿￿)) is a relevantly similar view, though one
that disagrees on the status of the wave function. Allori et al. (see also Sheldon Gold-
stein and Nino Zanghì (￿￿￿￿)) suggest it is like a law (though its precise status depends
on the particular theory of quantum mechanics); Maudlin (￿￿￿￿) refrains from putting
the wave function in a particular category. In a talk I heard some years ago, Maudlin
suggested that the wave function is unlike anything else, in its own metaphysical cate-
gory.
￿￿Or ￿ashes or mass densities: Allori et al. (￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
￿guration space is not an ontologically accurate (my phrase, notMaudlin’s￿￿)
depiction of a quantum world, even though it allows us to predict every-
thing that happens and so is informationally complete. The ontologi-
cally accurate description is instead given by particles in three-space (in
Bohm’s theory; alternatively, mass densities or ￿ashes in three-space in
GRW￿￿), even though this isn’t informationally complete (since that re-
quires the wave function).
In general, Maudlin warns, we cannot assume that informationally
complete descriptions are ontologically accurate. If we did, then we
would eliminate charged particles from the ontology of classical elec-
tromagnetism, for instance, since there is an informationally complete
description without them (because the divergence of the electric ￿eld
suf￿ces to give the charges’ locations). Likewise, for any deterministic
world, we would posit only whatever is in the world at one time, since
the state at a time plus the laws is informationally complete. In the case
of quantum mechanics, Maudlin argues, although the wave function in
con￿guration space is needed for informational completeness, there are
independent reasons—namely, the evidence from ordinary experience—
for positing three-dimensional objects, not the wave function, in the on-
tology.￿￿
This brings us to a basic disagreement between wave function space
and ordinary space views: how much to emphasize the dynamics in ￿g-
uring out the fundamental nature of the world. Three-space views prior-
itize our evidence from ordinary experience, claiming that the world ap-
pears three-dimensional because it is fundamentally three-dimensional.
Wave function space views prioritize our inferences from the dynamics,
claiming that the world is fundamentally high-dimensional because the
dynamical laws indicate that it is. Notice that, although this latter view
is counterintuitive, there is precedent for the inference it relies on, as in
￿￿I use the phrase because saying that the wave function isn’t ontologically complete
suggests that the wave function is in the ontology, it just isn’t everything. In Maudlin’s
view, the wave function isn’t in the physical ontology—it isn’t a physical ￿eld.
￿￿Though Maudlin (￿￿￿￿) gives considerations against the mass density picture.
￿￿There can be informationally complete descriptions that are ontologically com-
plete, like particles in classical mechanics. Maudlin suggests that whether informa-
tional and ontological completeness apply to the same description is to be decided on
a case-by-case basis.
￿￿
the case of space-time structure discussed earlier. Indeed, we can rely on
a similar inference for the ontology of classical electromagnetism, too.
Although the ￿eld values will give the locations of the charges, as Albert
has noted,￿￿ this will not give their masses, which are also needed to pre-
dict particle and ￿eld value locations at other times. In other words, the
￿eld values aren’t, in Albert’s phrase, dynamically complete. That’s why we
do not eliminate charges from the ontology: they are required by the
dynamical laws. (If the ￿eld description were dynamically complete, on
the other hand, we might well conclude that charges aren’t in the ontol-
ogy.￿￿) Wave function space views hew to this tradition of positing, in the
fundamental level of the world, whatever is required by the dynamics.
Against Maudlin, then, I think that informational completeness of
the right sort—dynamical completeness—does track ontological accu-
racy. A dynamically complete description contains the structure and on-
tology presupposed by the fundamental dynamical laws.￿￿ For Maudlin,
dynamical completeness and ontological accuracy can come apart: in
quantum mechanics, there is dynamical information that doesn’t cor-
respond to any structure in the physical world. According to our general
principle, however, the fundamental level of the world—the fundamen-
tal ontology, the fundamental space, and its structure—should contain
whatever is required to formulate the dynamical laws; there should be a
match between the structure needed for the dynamics and the fundamen-
tal structure of the physical world. If so, then we should infer that the
fundamental physical space of a quantum world is the high-dimensional
space of the wave function, with the fundamental ontology residing in it.
￿. The Structure of Appearances
Assuming that our world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, there
remains the question of whether wave function space realism can explain
the fact that we appear to live in three-dimensional space.
￿￿In a seminar at Columbia in ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿There was a history of trying to do this, but it didn’t work: Arntzenius (￿￿￿￿).
￿￿On this understanding, the state at one time in a deterministic world is not dynam-
ically complete. For the laws relate states at different times, thereby presupposing that
there are such states.
￿￿
Maudlin (￿￿￿￿) argues that it can’t, because it lacks what J. S. Bell calls
“local beables” (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿-￿￿), parts of the ontology localized to regions
of ordinary space(time). Indeed, Maudlin says, it is hard to see how we
could ever come to understand, let alone empirically con￿rm, such a
theory, when all of our evidence takes the form of local beables.￿￿
Now, it is true that there are no fundamental local beables, on this
view. But this doesn’t mean that there are no nonfundamental such
things. Indeed, I think that something like this holds for three-space
and its objects as a whole. Unlike Albert (￿￿￿￿), who argues that in a
quantum world, ordinary space is an “illusion” and our talk about it is
false,￿￿ I think that three-space exists in such a world, and our talk about
it is true. It’s just that this space is nonfundamental. Similarly, ordinary
particles exist but are nonfundamental. They are more like tables and
chairs: made up out of fundamental stuff, not themselves in the funda-
mental inventory.￿￿
In place of Albert’s antirealism about three-space, I suggest an anti-
fundamentalism. Ordinary space exists at a “higher level.” Even so, there
are objective facts about it and we can say true things about it. It’s just
that none of this is fundamental—just as tables and chairs exist and have
objective truths about them but are not fundamental. We might say that
statements about these things aren’t strictly speaking true, but this just
means that they are not fundamentally true. There is an objective fact as
to where something is located in three-space, even though there is no
such fundamental fact.
There are tricky issues here about exactly how to understand the
claim that ordinary space exists but is nonfundamental. On some recent
views in metaphysics, we cannot make sense of such claims; we must say
that the nonfundamental things simply do not exist.
I think that there is a way of making sense of the idea that ordinary
space is nonfundamental yet real, in the same way that ordinary objects,
the special sciences, and so on, are nonfundamental yet real. A grounding
￿￿See Maudlin (￿￿￿￿) for further argument along these lines.
￿￿Ney (￿￿￿￿b) in a different way argues that three-dimensional space doesn’t exist
in a quantum world.
￿￿Compare Albert and Loewer (￿￿￿￿) and Wallace (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
relation￿￿ captures the way that the wave function’s space is fundamental
and ultimately responsible for ordinary space, while at the same time
allowing for the reality of ordinary space. This is an explanatory relation
that captures the way in which one thing depends on or holds in virtue
of another, without implying that the dependent thing does not exist.
Thus, three-dimensional space and its objects are grounded in the wave
function’s space and its objects. For example, there being a table in three-
space consists in nothing but the wave function having a certain shape in
its high-dimensional space. It’s true that there is a table in three-space;
it’s just that this holds in virtue of some other, more fundamental facts.
The truth about three-space (the grounded) is not a further fact beyond
the truth about the wave function’s space (the grounds)—that is, it isn’t
a fundamental fact—even though it is distinct from the grounds and is
itself a real fact.
More generally, the wave function’s space is fundamental, and three-
space is grounded in it; what’s true of three-space holds in virtue of what’s
true of the wave function’s space. This captures the way that three-space
is emergent but “no less real for that” (Wallace and Timpson, ￿￿￿￿,
￿￿￿). It also captures the idea that three-dimensional happenings are
nothing over and above various wave function space happenings; that is,
that three-space is not fundamental. In the way that thermodynamic or
biological happenings, say, are nothing over and above various particle
happenings—the former processes are grounded in more fundamental
particle processes—so, too, for ordinary three-space happenings vis-à-
vis what goes on in the wave function’s space. (Thus, the grounding rela-
tion more generally captures the way in which there are ordinary macro-
level sciences, with generalizations that are objectively true. They just
aren’t fundamental, but hold in virtue of what goes on at the fundamental
level.)
I submit that this is the overall simplest, empirically adequate account
of a quantum world. It explains our experience and captures the truth of
our ordinary claims about three-dimensional space, while at the same
time positing just that structure that’s needed for the dynamics.￿￿ This
￿￿Say, like that of Fine (￿￿￿￿); what I say here is neutral on the metaphysics of
grounding.
￿￿Fine (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿) notes that we can evaluate a system of grounds “in much the same
￿￿
view has the bene￿t of a fundamental three-space view—what explains
the fact that the world appears three-dimensional is that there exists a
three-dimensional space—while also matching the structure and ontol-
ogy for the dynamics. (What it doesn’t do is explain the fact that three-
space appears fundamental by saying that three-space is fundamental.)
In particular, there is no fundamental structure beyond what is needed
for the dynamics. For there is no fundamental structure connecting or-
dinary space and the wave function’s space; there are simply “grounding
rules” from the fundamental to the nonfundamental, and these do not
add fundamental structure, in the same way that correspondence rules
for the special sciences don’t add fundamental structure to the world.
This picture also avoids the worry raised byMonton (￿￿￿￿) that the view
is radically revisionary. It is indeed fundamentally revisionary, but it is
not revisionary about the nonfundamental.
You might wonder why the wave function’s space grounds an emer-
gent three-dimensional space, not some other. Monton (￿￿￿￿) argues
that it doesn’t manage to do this, because there is no intrinsic structure
in the wave function’s space marking out a preferred grouping of axes
into threes. There is nothing special about the fact that the number of
dimensions is equal to “￿ times n”: this space isn’t fundamentally about
particles in three-space.
But we have more to work with than just the kinematical structure of
the space. There is also the dynamical structure, and this opens avenues
of response. Lewis (￿￿￿￿) (see also Lewis (￿￿￿￿)) argues that the wave
function’s space does have intrinsic structure picking out a preferred
grouping of dimensions into threes. Albert (￿￿￿￿) alternatively suggests
that the form of the Hamiltonian results in the illusion of three-space,
without extra intrinsic structure. Albert argues that the Hamiltonian has
a uniquely natural form in three dimensions; in my view, this natural-
ness is evidence that the grounded space is, in fact, three-dimensional.
Wallace and Timpson (￿￿￿￿) agree with Albert’s point, adding that the
experience of three dimensions should emerge due to decoherence.￿￿
I suspect that one of these views is correct. One of these can explain
way as any other explanatory scheme, on the basis of such considerations as simplicity,
breadth, coherence, or non-circularity” and most importantly, “explanatory strength.”
￿￿Though they argue that this is insuf￿cient to fully recover the world.
￿￿
how the fundamental facts about the wave function (and perhaps a world
particle) in the high-dimensional space ground the three-dimensional
facts. Even if not, though, we could take this as some additional fun-
damental structure. This structure isn’t needed for the dynamics. But
there is more guiding theory choice than just the “posit what’s needed
for the dynamics” rule. There is also empirical adequacy, which may re-
quire a primitive “preferred grouping of axes into threes” structure. That
is, the wave function’s space itself may have an additional level of struc-
ture marking where its dimensions group themselves into threes; this
would then ground the three-space facts. Even so, this view is prefer-
able overall. For it has just about the fundamental structure needed for
the dynamics, while also explaining how the fundamental facts ground
the three-dimensional facts. Notice that on any of these approaches, this
way of grouping the dimensions of the fundamental space is the right way
of doing so, because it captures the truths about the non-fundamental—
just as there is a correct way of carving up the fundamental statespace
intomacroscopic parameters, namely the way that yields the truths about
the higher-level sciences. Of course, none of this is to say exactly how
the grounding of three-space in the high-dimensional space occurs; that
question remains. But it answers the objection from local beables.
Finally, you might worry that the structure of the wave function’s
space remains unexplained on this view. I cannot say that it has the struc-
ture and dimensionality it does because it represents particle con￿gura-
tions in three-dimensional space. It isn’t fundamentally about particles
in three-space.
According to my view, however, the structure of the wave function’s
space is fundamental, not in need of explanation on the basis of any-
thing more fundamental. We infer this structure from other things, like
the dynamical laws; but this space has the structure it does because the
world fundamentally is the way that it is. It may seem remarkable that it
has just the right structure to yield the appearance—and the existence—
of a three-dimensional space. But of course it does, if this really is the
fundamental theory and those are the appearances that the theory saves.
Think of it this way. The relation between the wave function’s space
and its ontology, on the one hand, and three-dimensional space and its
ontology, on the other, is analogous to the relation between particles,
￿￿
on the one hand, and tables and chairs, on the other. Compare: isn’t
it remarkable, if particles are fundamental, that they should conspire to
make it seem as though there really are tables and chairs? But of course
particles conspire to form themselves into tables and chairs, if particles
really are in the fundamental level of reality and the nonfundamental
stuff includes tables and chairs. Since the apparent existence of tables and
chairs is the starting point for our theorizing, of course the fundamental
theory we are led to is one that predicts the appearances (and existence)
of tables and chairs. To put it another way, our evidence for the theory,
in the ￿rst place, is what we observe. But what we observe, everyone
agrees, is a parochial re￿ection of our own situation: we are familiar
with tables and chairs. It is then no great coincidence that we end up
with a fundamental theory that has the power to predict the appearances
for us.
￿. Conclusion
Why conclude that wave function space realism (or wave function space
fundamentalism) is a physically accurate picture of a quantum world?
Why not think the wave function’s space is just part of the mathematics
used to formulate the theory? Because we generally posit, in the physical
world, the fundamental structure and ontology presupposed by the dy-
namical laws. This match between dynamics and world is evidence that
this is the fundamental nature of a world governed by that dynamics.
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